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NOTE
FEDERAL TAX LAW-Home Office Deduction Narrowed: Commis-
sioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993)
I. IDNTRODUCMION
In the taxpayers' never-ending battle with the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS), Commissioner v. Soliman' has given the IRS an unexpected
boost in its ongoing efforts to curb a taxpayer's ability to take the home
office deduction under section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.).2 Under the general rule of section 280A,3 a qualifying taxpayer
is permitted to deduct certain business expenses for that portion of a
personal residence that is used exclusively and regularly for business
purposes.4 Additionally, the home office must be (1) the principal place
of business,5 (2) a place normally used by clients, patients, or customers,6
or (3) a structure unattached to the personal residence.7
Of these additional requirements, defining a taxpayer's "principal
place of business" 8 has been the focus of continuing debate, and various
1. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
2. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1988).
3. Id. The portions of I.R.C. § 280A relevant to this Note read as follows:
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a tax-
payer who is an individual or an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable under
this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by
the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence.
(c) Exceptions for certain business or rental use; limitations on deductions for such
use.-
(1) Certain business use.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent
such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a
regular basis-
(A) the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit,
in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
I § 280A.
4. Id. § 280A(c)(1).
5. Id § 280A(c)(1)(A).
6. Id. § 280A(c)(1)(B).
7. L § 280A(c)(1)(C).
8. Id. § 280A(c)(1)(A). "Principal place of business" is not defined in the statute.
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tests have been formulated to achieve equitable results. In Soliman, the
Supreme Court significantly narrowed the scope of the home office de-
duction by creating a "new" comparative test to determine whether an
individual's home office is his or her principal place of business.9 Under
this comparative test, the decision-maker must first compare the tax-
payer's places of business to ascertain which is the most important. 10
Second, the decision-maker must consider the amount of time the tax-
payer spends at each place of business."
The Supreme Court intended in Soliman to promote uniform deci-
sion-making' 2 and to resolve lower court conflicts in the determination
of a taxpayer's "principal place of business."' 3 However, the case will
likely lead to inconsistent results and make it more difficult for many
deserving taxpayers, particularly those who are self-employed, to take
the home office deduction. Rather than settling the issue, the Court's
new approach invites further litigation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
or Congress may need to provide further clarification.
This Note explores the background of the home office deduction and
offers a critical analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Soliman.
Additionally, it assesses the ramifications of the case in light of the grow-
ing number of individuals who maintain a home office as an integral part
of their trade or business. Finally, this Note presents options that Con-
gress should consider in any re-examination of section 280A.
II. STATEMENT OF =lm CASE
In 1983, Dr. Nadir Soliman claimed approximately $2500 in home
office deductions pursuant to I.R.C. section 280A(c)(1)(A),' 4 stating that
his home office was his principal place of business. Dr. Soliman was a
self-employed anesthesiologist who delivered his services at three Wash-
ington, D.C. area hospitals. Since none of the hospitals provided him
with an office, he maintained a separate room in his personal residence
as his business office. He spent an average of ten to fifteen hours each
week in his home office, contacting patients, maintaining billing records,
reading medical books, preparing to see patients, and conducting other
activities exclusively related to his self-employment as an anesthesiolo-
9. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 706 (1993).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 708.
13. Id. at 705.
14. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) (1988).
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gist. He spent approximately thirty to thirty-five hours per week at the
hospitals.
After completing an audit on Dr. Soliman's 1983 federal income tax
return,'- the Commissioner of the IRS disallowed his home office deduc-
tion, finding that his home office was not his principal place of business.
On appeal, the Tax Court held otherwise, concluding that Dr. Soliman's
home office was indeed his principal place of business, thus allowing him
the deduction.' 6 In its decision, the Tax Court abandoned its use of the
"focal point test."17 The focal point test was first enunciated by the Tax
Court in Baie v. Commissioner,'" where the court found that a taxpayer's
principal place of business "was the focal point of a taxpayer's activi-
ties."'19 The focal point, in turn, was determined by looking at where
goods and services were provided to customers and where revenues were
generated.20
Upon abandoning its use of the focal point test, the Tax Court
adopted a broader "facts and circumstances test" to determine a tax-
payer's principal place of business.2 Under this test, all facts and cir-
cumstances must be considered in ascertaining a taxpayer's principal
place of business.2 The court listed factors that should weigh heavily in
any such determination, including whether the home office is essential to
the business,2 whether there is an alternative location to perform the
office functions,24 and whether the taxpayer spends a substantial amount
of time there. 2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax
Court's decision,26 agreeing that the focal point test had led to inequi-
15. Prior to 1976, taxpayers wishing to take the home office deduction merely had to
check a box on their tax form. Since then, taxpayers have been required to fill out a separate
IRS form (Form 8829), which elicits information from the taxpayer regarding the home office.
The separate form acts as an easy "red flag" for auditors seeking to curb perceived taxpayer
abuse of the deduction.
16. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 29 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
17. Id at 25.
18. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
19. 1& at 109.
20. Id. at 109-10. In Baie, the taxpayer's principal place of business was determined to be
her hot dog stand, despite the fact that she used a home office for administrative work and her
kitchen for business-related food preparation.
21. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 27, 28.
26. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52,55 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
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ties,27 and that the facts and circumstances test would better elucidate
the "true headquarters"'  of the taxpayer's trade or business.
However, in Commissioner v. Soliman,29 the Supreme Court re-
versed the Fourth Circuit. It held that both the focal point test and the
Tax Court's facts and circumstances test were inappropriate. Instead,
the Court inserted its own comparative test.3 0 Applying this new test,
the Court disallowed Dr. Soliman's home office deduction by finding
that his home office was not where his most important work took
place.3' The Court further stated that the amount of time that Dr.
Soliman spent in his home office was insufficient to qualify the office as
his principal place of business.32
III. BACKGROUND OF =HE LAW
A. The Home Office Deduction
Under I.R.C. section 162, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct all ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred while carrying on a trade or business.33
Conversely, I.R.C. section 262 specifically disallows deductions for per-
sonal, living, or family expenses. 4 Between the two sections exists a
myriad of combinations, perhaps best illustrated by the taxpayer who
runs a business out of his or her own home.
Prior to 1976, Congress liberally allowed taxpayers to deduct home
office expenses under the section 162 standard for "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses.3 5 Under this low hurdle of proof, "ordinary
and necessary" expenses 36 could be deducted if they were deemed
merely "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer.37 This innocuous
27. Id-
28. Id.
29. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
30. Id. at 706. For an explanation of the comparative test, see supra text accompanying
notes 9-11.
31. Id. at 708. The Court stated that the actual treatment of patients was the "essence of
the professional service" and the "most significant event" in Dr. Soliman's business. Id.
32. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
34. Id. § 262.
35. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 705.
36. Ordinary and necessary expenses are those that are "common and accepted" within
the business community to which the taxpayer belongs. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114
(1933). Such expenses need not be everyday occurrences, but simply those that conform to
the "ways of conduct and the forms of speech prevailing in the business world." Id. at 115.
37. Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970). Under this definition, great
deference was given to the taxpayer in determining what expenses were ordinary and neces-
sary to the business. See also Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973) (holding that an
[Vol. 77:179
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standard led to many abuses, whereby taxpayers could easily convert
otherwise nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses into de-
ductible home office expenses?8
However, with the advent of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 9 Congress
enacted I.R.C. section 280A, thereby making it more difficult for taxpay-
ers to take the home office deduction.' Under section 280A, a taxpayer
cannot deduct home office expenses unless his or her particular circum-
stances fit within an exception to the general rule of nondeductibility of
expenses associated with a personal residence. 41 The home office must
be used exclusively on a regular basis for the business42 and be either the
taxpayer's principal place of business, a place where clients meet regu-
larly, or a separate structure.43
B. The Focal Point Test and Its Critics
Most of the ensuing litigation regarding section 280A has dealt with
the question, left unanswered by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of
1976,44 of what constitutes a taxpayer's principal place of business.45 In
response, the Tax Court in 1980 adopted the focal point test, which
deems a taxpayer's principal place of business to be that location where
income is generated and where goods and services are provided.46 The
focal point test does not take into account the amount of time a taxpayer
spends in the home office, the relative importance of the activities con-
IRS attorney's home office expenses were deductible as necessary even though his primary
office was not in the home), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
38. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3580. The report also found that the "appropriate and helpful" test had become an adminis-
trative quagmire for both the IRS and the courts. Id.
39. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 1-2000 (1988)).
40. I.R.C. § 280A (1988).
41. Id. § 280A(a).
42. Id. § 280A(c)(1).
43. Id. § 280A(c)(1)(A)-(C); see discussion supra part I.
44. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147, 148 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3580; see also H. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, 161 (1976).
Neither legislative report provides any definition of "principal place of business."
45. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B). "Principal place of business" is not defined in the Internal
Revenue Code.
46. See Bale v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109-10 (1980). A woman who operated a hot
dog stand and used parts of her home for business purposes was denied the home office de-
duction because her home was not the focal point of the business. The hot dog stand was
determined to be the focal point, since generation of income and sales took place there. Id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 18-20; Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 407 (9th
Cir. 1983) (denying account executive home office deduction, since the focal point of his busi-
ness was where the income was earned-at his employer's premises).
1993]
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ducted at the home office, the necessity of the home office, or the ex-
penses involved in establishing the home office.47
Many courts soon began to criticize this test, in part because it pre-
sumed that an employee's principal place of business was always the em-
ployer's principal place of business. In Drucker v. Commissioner, 4 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court,4 9 finding that a
musician's principal place of business was his home office, even though
his employer provided him with the stage on which he performed. 0
In Weissman v. Commissioner,51 the Second Circuit again reversed
the Tax Court, finding that although section 280A was "strict," a univer-
sity professor could take the home office deduction if he spent eighty
percent of his time researching and writing at home. 2 Weissman criti-
cized the focal point test for giving undue weight to the more "visible"
portion of an employee's job while disregarding other less visible yet
equally important activities related to the employment. 3
Further adding to the growing chorus of opposition to the test, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denounced the focal point test in
Meiers v. Commissioner.5 4 Meiers owned and operated a laundromat in
Appleton, Wisconsin. She spent an average of one hour per day in the
laundromat and two hours in her home office, drafting work schedules
and performing bookkeeping and other general managerial duties. 5
The Seventh Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, allowed Meiers to deduct
her home office expenses, concluding that the focal point test "places
undue emphasis upon the location where goods or services are provided
to customers and income is generated."5 6
47. 6 WENDI HANGEBRAUCK ET AL., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION
§ 25.143 (Martin M. Weinstein et al. eds., 1993).
48. 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
49. 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
50. Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69. The court noted that this was an instance "in which an em-
ployee's principal place of business is not that of his employer." Id.
51. 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983).
52. Id. at 513.
53. Id. at 514. The Second Circuit criticized the Tax Court for not recognizing that
although many professors spend the majority of their time on campus, other professors spend
most of their time at home researching and writing. Id.
54. 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 76. The court also noted that Mrs. Meiers made a "legitimate" business decision
to maintain the office in her home rather than at the laundromat, implicitly acknowledging a
general bias against maintaining legitimate business operations in the home. Id.
56. Id. at 79. The Seventh Circuit placed great emphasis on time spent in the home office.
The factor of time spent in the home office is one that courts have accorded various weight in
their determinations of a taxpayer's principal place of business. Other factors that the Sev-
enth Circuit considered important in its determination were the importance of the activities
[Vol. 77:179
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In response to these criticisms, the Tax Court in Soliman v. Commis-
sioner67 adopted a more liberal facts and circumstances test to determine
a taxpayer's principal place of business.58 The court stated that the prin-
cipal place of business is often the taxpayer's "administrative headquar-
ters."59 The court determined that the question of whether alternative
office space was available for "essential organizational activities of a
business" should weigh heavily in any determination. 60 The amount of
time spent at the home office, while important, should be given less def-
erence as a leading indicator of the importance of a taxpayer's home
office, since the "activities are so different from each other."61
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,62 holding that the new
test better reflected congressional intent because it looked not to which
location "generates income or client contact, but [to] which location is
the true headquarters of the business. 63 Like the Tax Court, the Fourth
Circuit did not compare the amount of time spent in the home office
with time spent in other business locations, nor did it compare the rela-
tive importance of the activities conducted at each location.
conducted in the home office, the necessity of the home office, and the amount of money
necessary to establish the home office. Id But cf. Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495,
497 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting no particular test and holding that emergency care physician was
not entitled to home office deduction when he spent 33-36 hours per week at one hospital and
an insubstantial amount of time in his home office).
57. 94 T.C. 20 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
58. Id. at 25. For additional historical background, see James A. Fellows, Current Status
of Home Office Deductions Needs Clarification, 72 J. TAx'N 332 (1990) (discussing problems
with the Tax Court's facts and circumstances test).
59. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 25.
60. Id. at 26. The court stated that both the physician's medical and administrative duties
were "equally essential to a successful medical practice." Id.
61. Id. The court emphasized that although time spent at the home office was not deter-
minative, the taxpayer should spend a "substantial" amount of time there. Id. at 29; see Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980) (as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 33320
(1983)). The proposed regulations state that in determining a taxpayer's principal place of
business, factors to be considered include the
facilities available to the taxpayer at each location for purposes of that business. For
example, if an outside salesperson has no office space except at home and spends a
substantial amount of time on paperwork at home, the office in the home may qualify
as the salesperson's principal place of business.
Id Although the proposed regulation never became binding in law, it nevertheless indicated a
strong inclination "to allow 'home office' deductions for taxpayers who maintain 'legitimate'
home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office."
Soliman, 935 F.2d at 55; see also Soliman, 94 T.C. at 28 (stating that "[w]hile proposed regula-
tions have no force or effect, they do state a considered position by respondent").
62. Soliman, 935 F.2d at 55.
63. Id.
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In part because of this failure to undertake a comparative analysis,'
and because other courts had undertaken such an analysis,65 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari66 to resolve the conflict between the
lower courts. The Court subsequently reversed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Soliman.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
Writing for the majority in Soliman,67 Justice Anthony Kennedy sig-
naled a sharp return to a strict interpretation of I.R.C. section 280A.
Kennedy's opinion ended a two-year hiatus during which the more lib-
eral facts and circumstances test allowed a greater number of taxpayers
to take the home office deduction. The Court, in fashioning the new
test, took into account criticisms of the focal point test. Additionally, it
considered how various appellate courts had answered the question of
what constitutes a taxpayer's principal place of business.68
The Court admitted that the new test was ultimately a facts and cir-
cumstances test, since no objective test could be relied upon to produce
a definitive answer in all cases.69 However, it held that two factors must
weigh heavily in any determination of a taxpayer's principal place of
business. First, courts must undertake a comparative analysis of each of
the taxpayer's business locations to determine which is the most impor-
tant.70 Second, the decision-maker 7' must ascertain the amount of time
spent at the home office to determine whether it is sufficient "to render
the home office the principal place of business in light of all of the
circumstances."'72
In determining which business location is the most important, the
Court revived a mainstay of the focal point test, holding that "the point
where goods and services are delivered must be given great weight in
determining the place where the most important functions are per-
64. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 705 (1993).
65. See Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495,497 (9th Cir. 1988); Meiers v. Commis-
sioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514-16 (2d
Cir. 1984); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1983).
66. Commissioner v. Soliman, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
67. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Souter.
68. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 705.
69. Id. at 706.
70. Id.
71. The decision-maker may be the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax Court, or an appel-
late court.
72. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708.
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formed."'73 The relative importance of each business location must be
determined individually in order for a comparative analysis to be made.
However, given the Court's emphasis on where goods and services are
delivered, it appears that in most instances that location will be pre-
sumed to be the most important location and, hence, the principal place
of business for section 280A purposes.
The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's emphasis on the necessity of
the home office for administrative work, finding that it was relevant but
not controlling, since "in integrated transactions, all steps are essen-
tial."'7 4 Further, the Court denounced the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
the unavailability of alternative office space for administrative work.
The Court held that such unavailability has "no bearing on... whether a
home office is the principal place of business." 75
In calculating the time element of the two-part analysis, the Court
noted that the amount of time spent at the home office must be com-
pared with the amount of time spent at other business locations.76 The
Court, however, did not mandate any specific minimum percentage of
time that must be spent at the home office in order to render it the prin-
cipal place of business. In a statement underscoring the difficulties that
courts have encountered in making the principal place of business deter-
mination, the Court noted that although "[t]here may be cases when
there is no principal place of business,... [t]he taxpayer's house does
not become a principal place of business by default. '77
While recognizing that no objective test could cover all situations, the
Court nonetheless did not hesitate to establish a framework of rules to
guide decision-makers in accomplishing the goal of a "fair and consistent
interpretation" 78 of section 280A. Thus, the Court's new rule is not en-
tirely original. Rather, it represents an amalgam of tests previously for-
mulated by the IRS and lower courts.7 9
73. Id at 706.
74. Id. at 707. The statement that the essentialness of the home office is relevant but not
controlling begs the question of which factor is controlling. The Court itself appears to answer
this question by emphasizing the importance of where goods are delivered or services are
rendered. Thus, although the Court insists that no one factor is controlling, since "we cannot
develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case," id. at 706, it basically
leaves intact the focal point framework.
75. Id at 707 (emphasis added).
76. IM
77. Id.
78. IM at 708.
79. As noted, the Court drew heavily from the focal point test, which defines principal
place of business as the point where services are rendered or goods are delivered. The ele-
ment of time spent at the home office was not a factor in the focal point test, but was a critical
1993]
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Applying the new rules to Dr. Soliman's case, the Court determined
that the doctor's treatment of patients at the three hospitals was the "es-
sence of the professional service"80 and the "most significant event in the
professional transaction."' Without positively determining which place
was Dr. Soliman's principal place of business, the Court determined that
his home office was not his principal place of business. 2 The Court also
found that the ten to fifteen hours per week he spent in the home office
were "insufficient to render the home office the principal place of busi-
ness."8 3 The Court did not say how much time would be sufficient, ap-
parently leaving such determinations to the individual judgments of
future triers of fact. 4
Justice Harry Blackmun joined in the majority opinion, but also
wrote a separate concurrence. He stressed that, as a general rule, the
home office deduction is "a matter of grace, not of right."' 5 As such, a
taxpayer must clearly show that his or her circumstances fit within an
exception to the general rule of nondeductibility. 6 Justice Blackmun
agreed that the word "principal" in "principal place of business" com-
pelled a comparative analysis,' and that under such an analysis the hos-
pitals must be determined to be Dr. Soliman's principal place of
business. 88 He invited Congress to change the law if it desired a differ-
ent outcome.8 9
element in the old facts and circumstances test. Thus, a taxpayer could deduct home office
expenses if he or she spent a substantial amount of time in the home office. Soliman v. Com-
missioner, 94 T.C. 20, 26 (1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
80. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court did not say which hospital, if any, was his principal place of business,
but only noted that his home office did not qualify as a home office for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 280A. Id.
83. Id
84. See I.R.S. Notice 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 46-7. The IRS provides taxpayers with a few
examples that may shed some light as to what is regarded as a sufficient amount of time spent
in the home office. In the three examples provided, however, the only example in which a
taxpayer is allowed a home office deduction is when approximately 70% of his work time is
spent in his home office. Id. It is unclear whether this figure will become a "bright line" rule
in decision-making by the IRS.
85. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 709.
89. Id
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Justice Clarence Thomas was joined by Justice Antonin Scalia in a
separate concurring opinion.9" Both Justices agreed with the Court's re-
suit, but continued to favor the focal point test in all but a few "ex-
traordinary cases" where income is generated at more than one
location. 91 In such cases, the focal point test may not lead to a determi-
nation of a principal place of business, and then the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test could be used. 92 The Justices questioned the use of the
majority's new test as an effective rule for every case, fearing that .it
would lead to "full blown evidentiary hearings" 93 each time the Commis-
sioner denied a home office deduction. They also criticized the majority
for failing to clarify the issue once and for all.9 4 Finally, the Justices criti-
cized the majority for failing to identify which of the new test's two fac-
tors-the importance of the activity or the amount of time spent at the
home office-was more important in determining a taxpayer's principal
place of business.95
Justice John Paul Stevens, the lone official dissenter,96 stated that the
Court's new test would "breed uncertainty in the law, frustrate a primary
purpose of the statute, and unfairly penalize deserving taxpayers."'  He
argued that the already stringent requirements of the Tax Court's "facts
and circumstances" test98 would ensure that abuses could almost never
90. Id. at 709 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
91. Id. at 710 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring). Justices Thomas and Scalia seem to
believe that a business involving "multiple points of sale" is "extraordinary." Id. (Thomas &
Scalia, JJ., concurring). This broad statement does little to adequately reflect the reality of the
business world, where there is a growing trend toward work-at-home businesses, many of
which may have more than one income-generating location.
92. Id. (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring). The totality of the circumstances test referred
to by the concurring Justices is essentially the two-part comparative and time analysis enunci-
ated by the majority. Id. (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
93. Id. at 709 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
94. Id. at 711 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
95. Id. (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
96. Although Justice Stevens wrote the only actual dissent, Justices Thomas and Scalia
agreed only with the majority's result; they strongly disagreed with the Court's new "compara-
tive" test. Id. at 709-10 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring). Additionally, although Justice
Blackmun felt "compelled" to join in the majority opinion because of the present form of
I.RC. § 280A, he almost seemed apologetic about having to do so and invited Congress to
change the law if it desired a different outcome. Id. at 709 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. The facts and circumstances test looks to many factors, including whether the home
office is essential to the taxpayer's business, whether the taxpayer spends a substantial amount
of time there, and whether alternative office space is available to the taxpayer. Soliman v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20,25-28 (1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993).
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occur,99 thereby accomplishing Congress's goal in enacting section 280A.
He also criticized the new test on the ground that it would "result in the
unequal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. ' '1"" Of particular con-
cern to Justice Stevens was the plight of many self-employed individuals,
who, he argued, would face greater obstacles in obtaining the section
280A deduction-a result that Congress surely did not intend. 01 In Jus-
tice Stevens's opinion, Dr. Soliman's home office is not only his principal
place of business, it is his only place of business.'0
Additionally, Justice Stevens echoed the Tax Court'0 3 in arguing that
the principal place of business exception is made moot by the new test
because it is merged with another section 280A exception, which allows
a home office deduction if the home office is used "as a place of business
which is used by patients, clients or customers in meeting or dealing with
the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business."'" Since the
Court's new test places great weight on the point at which services are
rendered or goods are delivered, which generally requires client or cus-
tomer contact, the new test vitiates the principal place of business excep-
tion as a free standing exception. 0 5
V. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Comparative Analysis
The Supreme Court's comparative analysis in Commissioner v.
Soliman is an ineffective method of bringing fairness and consistency' 016
99. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, a physician who must go to a hospi-
tal to deliver most services would be denied the home office deduction, whereas another phy-
sician who did the same work but was wealthy enough to own property with a separate
structure on it would be able to take the home office deduction under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(C).
Similarly, if a physician could render services to patients at the home office, the home office
deduction could be taken under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B). Justice Stevens argued that Congress
could not have intended such a disparate result. Id. at 711-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "Congress intended
only to prevent deductions for home offices that were not genuinely necessary business ex-
penses." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25
(1990), afjTd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993)).
104. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B) (1988).
105. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that by
effectively merging these two exceptions, the majority opinion did not reflect congressional
intent in creating I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A). Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708. One of the Court's goals was to formulate rules "for the
fair and consistent interpretation of a statute that speaks in the most general of terms." Id.
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to the determination of a taxpayer's principal place of business for I.R.C.
section 280A purposes. The new test purports to resolve the conflict be-
tween the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and other appellate courts 0 7
regarding the implementation of, or lack of, a comparative analysis in
making the determination. 08 While the Court's decision requires lower
courts to use a comparative analysis, application of the new "compara-
tive" test will likely lead to unfair and inconsistent results. This, in turn,
will ultimately lead to new conflicts and increased litigation.
The most probable future conflict is likely to be an old focal point
test criticism with a new name. Rather than debating the merits of what
is a business's focal point, litigants will begin debating what constitutes
the "most important" business location. Yet in Soliman, the Supreme
Court seemed to answer this question with echoes of the focal point test,
stating that although it "can be misleading.., the point where goods and
services are delivered must be given great weight in determining the
place where the most important functions are performed." 0 9 This is a
basic reiteration of the focal point test. Although the Court left itself an
escape valve, saying that "no one test is determinative in every case,"" 0
the Court failed to address the criticisms of the focal point test voiced
during the 1980s by many appellate courts and the Tax Court."'
Most important, by reviving this major tenet of the focal point test,
the Court has taken it upon itself to make a value determination: a pre-
107. E.g., Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988); Meiers v. Commis-
sioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984);
Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
108. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 705.
109. Id. at 706 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that "[i]f the nature of the
trade or profession requires the taxpayer to meet or confer with a client or patient or to
deliver goods or services to a customer, the place where that contact occurs is often an impor-
tant indicator of the principal place of business." I& Again, this submerges I.R.C.
§ 280A(c)(1)(A) (the principal place of business exception) within I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B)
(the place used by clients exception). See supra note 105 and accompanying text. As Justice
Stevens aptly noted in his dissent, Congress left each exception free standing, and one excep-
tion should not be dependent on fulfilling conditions of another. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25 (1990), affd, 935
F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993) (stating that the focal point test "merges
the 'principal place of business' exception with the 'meeting clients' exception and practically
eliminates the principal place of business exception from Section 280A").
110. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706. Justices Thomas and Scalia feared that the Court's new
comparative test would lead to "full-blown evidentiary hearings" to determine the most im-
portant place of business each time the Commissioner denied a taxpayer's home office deduc-
tion. Id. at 709 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
111. See Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988); Meiers v. Commis-
sioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984);
Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
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sumption that the home office generally cannot be the most important
place of business if what takes place there is "simply" managerial or ad-
ministrative work." 2 This presumption is rebuttable, however. It is at
least arguable, and at most probable, that managerial and administrative
functions are the most important aspects of any business. No business
can operate for very long if it is not well operated and managed. This is
especially so in the case of a self-employed taxpayer like Dr. Soliman,
who must have an office and who has no alternative office space. How-
ever, the Court concluded that necessity is relevant, but not control-
ling.113 Similarly, the Court stated that lack of alternative office space is
irrelevant. 14 Thus, even though Dr. Soliman used his home office as his
business headquarters, the Court made a value determination that his
most important work took place at the hospitals, and therefore the home
office was not his principal place of business. The Court determined that
treating patients was inherently more important than running the
business.
The Court agreed that the determination of what is "principal" is
fundamentally subjective." 5 "Principal" has been defined as "chief;
leading; most important. 11 6 Alternatively, "principal office" has been
defined as the "headquarters, or the place where the chief or principal
affairs and business of the corporation are transacted.... Synonymous
with 'principal place of business.""' 7 Yet the Court, having received no
explicit guidance from Congress as to whether Congress meant principal
office," 8 concluded that a comparative analysis of business locations was
112. Unless, of course, the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time at the home
office, in which case the taxpayer might receive the deduction. The Court does not promise,
however, that a taxpayer who spends a substantial amount of time at the home office but
whose goods and services are delivered elsewhere will necessarily obtain the home office de-
duction. See infra part V.B for a discussion of the time analysis.
113. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
114. Id. In doing so, the Court ignored lower courts' findings that lack of alternative
office space is a factor that should be considered. See Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d
512, 515 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the lack of a private on-campus facility makes professor's
home office a necessity); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that the fact that musician was not provided with a place to practice was relevant).
115. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706. The Court admitted that it "cannot develop an objective
formula that yields a clear answer in every case." Id.
116. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (6th ed. 1990); see also WEBSTER'S THMRD Nnw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1802 (1971) (defining "principal" as "most important, conse-
quential, or influential").
117. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1083 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
118. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, Congress may have written "principal place
of business" rather than "principal office" to encompass all businesses, since many business-
persons, such as artists or cabinet-makers, do not have a traditional office. Soliman, 113 S. Ct.
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compelled.11 9 The Court's reading of the statute hardly seems com-
pelled; it is equally plausible that Congress simply meant "principal
office."
B. Problems with the Time Analysis
The Supreme Court also stated that the amount of time spent at the
home office compared with the amount of time spent at other business
locations is of paramount importance, especially when the comparative
analysis "yields no definitive answer to the principal place of business
inquiry."' 2 However, the Court gave no further guidance as to how
much time spent in the home office is enough. In Dr. Soliman's case,
spending ten to fifteen hours per week in the home office was not
enough. 21 Yet it is unclear how many hours he would have needed to
have spent in the home office for it to have "become" his principal place
of business.
The IRS has indicated that a taxpayer spending approximately sev-
enty percent of his or her time in the home office will be eligible for the
deduction.122 However, it remains unclear whether even seventy percent
will suffice if the comparative analysis first determines that the home
office is not the most important place of business. The Court did not
state which analysis-the comparative analysis or the time analysis-is
more important 2 3 Similarly, the Court did not state in what order the
analyses should be performed.
Consider the example of a self-employed physician who spends a
weekly average of thirty-five hours in the home office and fifteen hours
in the hospital. If the comparative analysis is more critical to the princi-
pal place of business determination, the hospital would likely be found
to be the principal place of business, 24 and the physician would proba-
at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also noted that the principal place of business has been
used interchangeably with the term "main office" in other decisions. I&. at 714 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
119. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
120. Id at 707.
121. Id at 708.
122. I.R.S. Notice 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 46-7. In this publication, the only example given in
which a deduction was allowed involved a salesperson who spent 30 hours per week selling
goods out of his home office and 12 hours per week visiting customers. Thirty hours out of a
total of 42 equals 71.43%. Id.
123. The Court fails to state how critical the time analysis is, stating only that it becomes
"particularly significant" when the comparative analysis fails to produce a clear answer.
Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
124. This is assuming, per Soliman, that "actual treatment [is] the essence of the profes-
sional service." Id. at 708.
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bly be denied the deduction. On the other hand, if the time analysis is
more critical to the determination, the fact that the physician spent more
time at home than in the hospital would become controlling, and the
physician would most likely get the deduction. Thus, it is probable that
future lower court interpretations of Soliman, based on similar factual
patterns, will lead to different results. Clearly, this was not the Court's
intention in Soliman.- 5
C. Discriminatory Effect of the Decision
The Supreme Court's decision will have the unintended effect of dis-
criminating against certain types of businesspersons. Those most likely
to be negatively impacted include health care professionals, the self-em-
ployed, construction contractors, outside salespeople, musicians, house
painters, consultants, caterers, and interior decorators. 26 Since the
place where income is generated most often will be deemed a taxpayer's
principal place of business, those professionals whose income is largely
generated outside the home will usually be denied the deduction, even
though most, if not all, of their business expenses are generated in the
home office. Dr. Soliman is such a professional, who, due to the nature
of his profession, cannot deduct his legitimate business expenses. 2 7
Another discriminatory effect is evinced by the Court's statement
that "there may be cases when there is no principal place of business.""
Simply because the Commissioner or the courts cannot ascertain a tax-
payer's principal place of business does not mean that one does not exist.
To deny the existence of any principal place of business is to fly in the
face of commercial reality and to disallow certain taxpayers a home of-
fice deduction, simply because the nature of their business does not fit
neatly into the Court's analysis.' 9 While the home office deduction may
125. Id. The Court's paramount goal in Soliman was the "fair and consistent interpreta-
tion of a statute that speaks in the most general of terms." Id.
126. For a more detailed look at how various professions may be adversely affected by the
decision, see Robert T. Kelly, Jr., Home Office Deductions Restricted by Supreme Court, 50
TAX'N FOR Accr. 196 (1993); see also Lynn Asinoff, How Supreme Court's Home-Office Rul-
ing Affects You, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1993, at C1.
127. Conversely, those taxpayers who, due to the nature of their business, spend the vast
majority of time at home, are less likely to be affected by the ruling.
128. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707 (emphasis added). The Court held that if no principal
place of business can be determined, the home office does not become the principal location
"by default." Id.
129. Consider the example of a self-employed person who provides home health care
services to 10 homes and maintains the managerial and administrative headquarters of the
business in a home office, spending 20 hours per week in the home office. Since the taxpayer
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indeed be "a matter of grace, not of right,' 130 no one type of business
should be given grace over another. A business is a business; the inad-
vertent singling out of certain types of trades or professions for denial of
the home office deduction will be an unfortunate result of the Court's
decision in Soliman.
Finally, the new rule discriminates against those who are not wealthy
enough to build a separate structure for their home office 13 1 or to rent
office space outside the home. A wealthy suburban stockbroker will
simply build a "shed" in the yard or rent an office elsewhere. An inner-
city home health care provider may not have the same option. Regard-
less of one's income, however, it often makes excellent business sense to
maintain a headquarters in the home, 32 avoiding the additional ex-
penses of rent and transportation' 33 to another location.
D. Congressional Involvement Needed
Although there exists a presumption of nondeductibility of personal,
living, and family expenses,3 there exists a concomitant presumption
that ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in conducting a trade or
business are deductible.' 3 When Congress formulated section 280A in
1976, it intended only to prevent taxpayers from converting otherwise
nondeductible personal expenses into deductible business expenses, not
to prevent taxpayers from deducting legitimate business expenses. 36
The Supreme Court's new test goes beyond that limited purpose and
achieves unintended results. In its attempt to winnow out abuse, the
Court has inadvertently created a test that will prevent many taxpay-
fluctuates between 11 different locations, the Court might conclude that the taxpayer has no
principal place of business.
130. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Commissioner v. Sulli-
van, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
131. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(C) states that a deduction may be taken "in the case of a sepa-
rate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business." I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(C) (1988).
132. See Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that taxpayer
made a "legitimate business decision not to create office space at the laundromat").
133. See Rhonda M. Abrams, Don't Give Up Home Office Deduction, Gannett News Ser-
vice, May 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File (criticizing Court's decision
and noting that a taxpayer who rents office space for a business can take the full deduction,
but a home-based business is not accorded the same treatment).
134. I.R.C. § 262 (1988).
135. Id. § 162.
136. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 38; see also Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79 ("[The] purpose of
Congress [is] to prevent taxpayers from converting non-deductible personal expenses into de-
ductible business expenses while ensuring that taxpayers retain their entitlement to deduct neces-
sary business expenses.") (emphasis added).
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ers 3 7 from taking a deduction that Congress likely intended them to
have.
The Court's analysis is not in step with commercial practice and eco-
nomic reality. The number of taxpayers who opt to work at home is
growing, as is the number of taxpayers who actually run a business out of
the home. 3 ' Many of these include recently laid-off workers who have
made a new start on their own.13 9 Although the legislative history is
silent,'140 Congress could not have intended for these taxpayers to be pe-
nalized for making a business decision to maintain part of the business at
home. The Court admitted that a decision-maker ultimately must look
to "life in all its fullness"'141 to answer questions of deductibility, yet its
chosen parameters belie its stated intention to produce "fair and consis-
tent"'42 results.
It is time for Congress to step in and clarify the home office deduc-
tion issue. If Congress agrees with the Court's interpretation, it should
codify the tenets of Soliman into section 280A. In the more probable
event that Congress disagrees with the Court's decision, it should amend
the section to reflect its views.
One way Congress could amend section 280A would be to clearly
define a taxpayer's principal place of business. The definition could pro-
vide that if a taxpayer has only one office, and it is the home office, then
the home office is the principal place of business for section 280A
purposes.
On a more basic level, Congress could also amend section
280A(c)(1)(A) to read "principal office or principal place of business."
137. Most notable, as mentioned, are self-employed individuals. The concern about abuse
and converting otherwise personal expenses is less of a concern with these individuals who,
unless they rent other space, must use their own home as their business headquarters. Under
the new test, many taxpayers such as the musician in Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67
(2d Cir. 1983), or the professor in Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984),
who had previously been able to take the home office deduction, are now unable to do so.
138. Approximately 30 million Americans work out of the home. See Gwen Hall, Home
Based Businesses Create Local Controversies, Gannett News Service, Nov. 10, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File; see also New Publishers Serve At-Home Workers, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at D10. The number of publications serving the growing number of at-
home workers has risen dramatically. At present there are approximately 50 publications. Id
139. See Louis Uchitelle, Newest Corporate Refugees: Self-Employed but Low-Paid, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al (discussing how the recession has forced many laid-off employees
to become self-employed).
140. S. Rup. No. 938, supra note 38, at 148.
141. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 708 (1993) (quoting Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933)).
142. Id.
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The existing requirements that the home office must be used on a regu-
lar basis and exclusively for business purposes 43 would prevent abuse.
At least five members of Congress have introduced bills that seek to
achieve similar results.1" Representative Rod Grams of Minnesota has
introduced a bill 45 that would allow the home office deduction when the
home is the sole fixed business location. 146 Representatives Wayne Al-
lard of Colorado and Jim Bunning of Kentucky have introduced a bill
that is similar, but which goes even further, allowing the deduction re-
gardless of "the amount of time or type of work" performed in the home
office. 147 Representative Kweisi Mfume of Maryland has introduced a
bill"4 that would allow the home office deduction if the home office is
the location for management activities.1 49 Finally, Senator Conrad
Burns of North Dakota has introduced a bill 50 that adopts the Tax
Court's facts and circumstances test as first enunciated in 1990.151 The
pace at which bills have been introduced since the Soliman decision was
143. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1988). Congress, if it so chooses, could codify additional re-
quirements, such as those that have been enumerated by various courts (e.g., necessity and
lack of alternative space) to ensure that abuses are prevented.
144. Congressmen Rod Grams of Minnesota, Wayne Allard of Colorado, Jim Bunning of
Kentucky, Kweisi Mfume of Maryland, and Senator Conrad Bums of North Dakota have
introduced bills in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Soliman. See
infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
145. H.R. 2291, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
146. H.R. 2291 provides, in pertinent part, that I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) would be changed
to read: "(A) as the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer or as
the sole fixed location of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer." H.R. 2291, supra
note 145.
147. H.R. 2444,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) would amend I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) to read:
(A) as the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer, or as
the sole fixed location of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer who has no
other fixed location of business for such trade or business, regardless of (i) the amount
of time or type of work the taxpayer performs in such fixed location, or (ii) the propor-
tion of the total income from the business attributable to such location ....
Id. The bill also contains a provision allowing for the deduction of business expenses attribu-
table to home storage space for product samples. Section 280A(c)(2) currently allows a de-
duction for storage space only for inventory, not product samples.
148. H.R. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
149. H.R. 687 would add the following to I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1): "For purposes of subpara-
graph (A), in the case of a trade or business which would not (but for this sentence) have a
principal place of business, its principal place of business shall be where substantially all of the
management activities for such trade or business occur." H.R. 687, supra note 148.
150. S. 1116, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
151. S. 1116 would add to I.R.C. § 280A(c) the following:
(7) TREATMENT OF HOME OFFICE AS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS.-
For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), if-
(A) management or administrative activities are essential to the trade or business
of the taxpayer,
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announced indicates that there is already strong bipartisan support for
making the home office deduction more widely available to taxpayers.
The amount of congressional and public support 52 garnered for these
bills in the coming months will likely determine the fate of the home
office deduction.
Additionally, Congress should clarify how much time spent in the
home office is sufficient to obtain the deduction. 3 The IRS has given
guidelines based on Soliman,54 but even the guidelines do not assure
borderline taxpayers 55 that they may take the deduction. This uncer-
tainty will prevent many deserving businesspersons from taking the de-
duction. Many taxpayers simply will not claim the deduction in order to
avoid any potential encounter with the IRS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1976, Congress determined that there existed "a great need for
definitive rules"'15 6 regarding the deductibility of home office expenses.
The same is even more true today. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Soliman157 narrows the availability of the deduction without providing
definitive rules that are needed to lead to "fair and consistent" resultsY.5 8
A few simple changes would end the continuing uncertainty and injustice
that prevails. Congress and the courts should not fear that widening the
availability of the home office deduction will be costly or lead to abuse.
(B) the only available office for such activities is in the dwelling unit of the
taxpayer,
(C) such office is essential to such trade or business, and
(D) the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time in such office, the portion of
such dwelling unit which is used exclusively on a regular basis for such office shall be
treated as the principal place of business for such trade or business.
S. 1116, supra note 150. This is a basic reiteration of the Tax Court's more liberal facts and
circumstances test. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
152. Several lobbying organizations have already indicated their support for one or more
of the various bills, including the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), the
Bureau of Wholesale Sales Representatives, the National Shoe Travelers, the International
Home Furnishing Representatives Association, and the Direct Selling Association.
153. H.R. 2444 allows the deduction regardless of the amount of time spent in the home
office. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
154. I.R.S. Notice 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 46-7; see supra notes 84 and 122 and accompanying
text.
155. A borderline taxpayer is one who may be able to take the home office deduction
depending on how the particular trier of fact interprets the Court's decision in Soliman. See
supra Part V.B.
156. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 38, at 147, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3579.
157. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113. S. Ct. 701 (1993).
158. Id. at 708.
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Sufficient safeguards exist to prevent such abuse,159 and the cost would
not be prohibitive.16 A straightforward change in the law would recog-
nize the increasing importance of home offices in today's business world,
and reflect the reality that the workplace of the future will continue to
be replete with increasing numbers of businesses that do not fit into
traditional definitions. The law should reflect that reality.
JoAN. M. HARVATH
159. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1988) requires the home office to be exclusively used on a regu-
lar basis for business purposes in all cases. See also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
160. The amount of the deduction is often minimal to begin with, since it represents only
that portion of the residence used for the business. Additionally, since the home office is
considered nonresidential real property, depreciation must generally be taken over 39 years
using the straight line method; thus, it is a relatively small amount each year. I.R.C.
§ 168(b)(3)(A), (c)(1).
Approximately 1.6 million taxpayers filed home office deductions for a total of approxi-
mately $2.4 billion in 1992. Elizabeth M. MacDonald, How to Write Off a Home Office,
Momy, Mar. 1993, at 16. In relative terms of total dollars, the cost (in terms of lost revenues)
of widening the availability of the home office deduction is not likely to be prohibitive. Addi-
tionally, any cost would be offset by revenue gains elsewhere under the 1990 statutory man-
date of revenue neutrality. Omunibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §§ 13001-13501,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
This new requirement, also known as "pay as you go," states that all enacted spending and
revenue legislation must neither increase nor reduce total federal tax collections over a five-
year period. The system was mandated in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which was
included as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Id.
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